Nataliia @DavidAdriy

"For nearly two months, occupied Oleshky has received no food deliveries. Eggs cost $12 a dozen. Potatoes cost $4–7.50 per kilogram. A single carrot costs $1.50. Cereals sell for $8.60 per 800 grams. A pack of cigarettes costs nearly $15—if anything is available at the market. Dogs are eating jam because there's nothing else to feed them. Chickens survive on compressed sunflower and corn waste. Fresh grass has dried up. 'The city is burning. How much longer can people endure these tortures? Please don't forget us.'" This is a message from residents of occupied Oleshky, under russian occupation. Hunger is being used as a weapon.

Chita, Zabaykalsky Krai. A 4.4 km fuel queue, one of the longest documented so far. According to the person filming, everyone who wants to join this line has to wait no less than 24 hours just to reach the gas station. P.S. The author also claims the queue was actually 5–6 km long, but that cannot be verified from the available footage and provided description.

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Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 @bayraktar_1love

2 days ago

Chernyshevsk, Zabaykalsky Krai. Russians celebrate finally reaching the gas station after spending two days in line. They say the station has only a small amount of fuel left, and the next delivery is expected no earlier than the day after tomorrow. That means anyone still

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25 февраля 2022. Уничтоженная колонна российских агрессоров в районе Ирпени. Украинский военный предупреждает россиян – кто придет на нашу землю тут и сдохнет. Это было актуально тогда, это актуально сейчас. Русский оккупант убирайся из Украины.

HODGES: Imagine in a country like Russia, which has more oil and gas resources than almost anybody on planet, you have queues at gas stations due to gas shortages. So, Ukraine has hit on theory of victory for how they’re going to do this. And Russians don’t seem able to stop it.

Japanese officials showed up wearing traditional Ukrainian vyshyvankas to greet the Ukrainian delegation during their visit to Tokyo. A nice touch of solidarity.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ 🇯🇵🤝🇺🇦

‼️ Putin is trying to shift the blame away from himself. Ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections, Putin decided to openly associate himself with the United Russia party, which, for the first time since 2007, has once again called itself "the president's party." Putin's decision to tie himself more closely to United Russia should be viewed as more than just an attempt to influence the party's ratings. It reflects the Kremlin's need to reshape the balance between the government's authority and responsibility at a time when Russians are increasingly feeling the impact of the war. For many years, Putin's model rested on a simple division of roles. Real power was concentrated in the hands of the president. Authority also belonged to him: Putin stood above the government, parliament, governors, and the ruling party as the ultimate arbiter. In the eyes of Russians, Putin was associated with military victories and foreign policy. Meanwhile, responsibility for the regime's failures was pushed downward - to ministers, officials, state-owned companies, and United Russia. In 2026, this model began to break down. Ukrainian strikes on oil refining infrastructure, fuel shortages, mobile internet outages, inflation, and a general deterioration in economic expectations are becoming increasingly difficult to separate from the war and Putin's own decisions. Russians began to ask: Could it be that the leader doesn't really know what he's doing? Against this backdrop, United Russia has once again begun calling itself "the president's party" - for the first time since 2007. At the party convention, slogans such as "Being for Putin is the bare minimum" appeared. This is a significant shift. Putin no longer simply stands above the party. His personal authority is being directly integrated into its election campaign. Support for United Russia hovers in the mid-30% range, while Putin's personal ratings are significantly higher. In late June, FOM recorded a 69% approval rating for the president - the lowest figure since the start of the full-scale war. VCIOM reported a figure of about 77%. At the same time, economic pessimism is growing. According to Gallup, 60% of Russians believe the economic situation is worsening, and 56% report declining living standards. Confidence in the government has fallen from 66% in 2022 to 53%, and confidence in the military has dropped from 80% to 66%. Under these circumstances, Putin is using his own rating as a resource for the party. But this is not just about electoral support. The Kremlin is trying to ensure that support for Putin automatically means support for the entire system - the parliamentary majority, the government, the war, and the country's public policy. ‼️ This changes the very model of power. Previously, Putin was a leader above the system. Now he is increasingly becoming its official center and political brand. In the short term, this is advantageous. The president's personal authority keeps governors, officials, and regional administrations in line. United Russia's election results become a test of their loyalty. A weak result in any given region can be interpreted not merely as a setback for the party, but as evidence of poor performance by local authorities. At the same time, Putin's stronger association with the party makes it possible to spread the responsibility for the consequences of the war more widely. Now, the deterioration in quality of life caused by the war is the responsibility not of a single person, but of the entire state apparatus - the government, parliament, the party, and the governors. In this sense, Putin is trying to expand the circle of those who share responsibility for the regime with him, without expanding the circle of those who have the right to determine its course. There is a certain similarity here to the Soviet Union. The Kremlin is trying to create a broader party-state framework capable of disciplining the elites, fostering loyalty, and ensuring the system's manageability. The main contradiction lies in the fact that a truly strong party would have to gain its own political weight. It would have to independently form its team, reconcile the interests of the elites, and participate in shaping the future of the regime. But that would mean the emergence of a center of power other than Putin. This is precisely what Putin does not allow. He does not create collective governance. He creates a collective service of his personal power - a system where he alone makes decisions, while strategic spheres are personally entrusted to members of his family. At the same time, their burden of responsibility for failures is diluted and shifted onto others. This is clearly demonstrated by the way energy minister Sergey Tsivilyov - the husband of Putin's niece, Anna Tsivilyova - was "shielded" from accountability and criticism, even though he is formally responsible for the sector at the center of the fuel crisis. However, responsibility for the fuel shortage was diffused among Alexander Novak, the energy ministry, the governors, and the oil companies. Tsivilyov remained in the system but was not made its primary public scapegoat. Will this model of delegation help resolve Russia's crisis of personalized power, which may well occur? This model could be effective in the short term. It helps conduct controlled elections, mobilize administrative resources, and distribute the political costs of the war. But it has an obvious risk. The more United Russia identifies itself as Putin's party, the harder it is for Putin to distance himself from all the negative moments Russians associate with the party, the government, and regional elites.

I totally understand!

Ukrainian drones have just reached the Omsk region—a distance of 2,500 km. The largest oil refinery there—and in all of Russia—has remained unscathed until now. We hope that changes now.

The video shows Russian army soldiers captured in Ukraine's Kharkiv region. The Center for Countering Disinformation reported that over 28,000 recruited foreigners have already been identified within the ranks of the Russian occupying forces. The Kremlin is using them to compensate for its frontline losses. They are lured with fake job offers, after which their documents are confiscated, and they are thrown into 'meat assaults' completely unprepared.

Remember when russians said they would change the world? They did. Now half the internet is watching russia burn😁🔥🔥

1/ Female Russian convict soldiers are complaining that the Russian military has reneged on their contracts. Instead of being pardoned after completing their military service, they say, they will now be sent back to jail.

❗️The SBU confirmed five drone hits on aircraft shelters at the Saky military airfield in occupied Crimea. According to preliminary information, two shelters held Su-30 and Su-30SM fighters at the time of the attack. A fire was recorded in the shelter containing the Su-30SM, indicating a successful strike on the target. #Ukraine

The richest man on Earth dismantled the organization that feeds the poorest children on earth. Elon Musk's dismantling of USAID has already killed more children than in Lebanon, Gaza and Ukraine combined. He cut lifetimes for millions and the result is a silent massacres. The definition of evil is being a trillionaire in a world where millions of children are starving. This is what Elon Musk doesn't want you to see on this platform. This is one of the reasons I am being shadow banned on X.

Ukraine is launching controlled exports of domestically produced weapons and defense technologies through a new government mechanism. Every export contract must serve one strategic goal: strengthening Ukraine’s defense industrial base and delivering more weapons for our Armed Forces. Under the new framework, 20% of proceeds from exports of finished defense products and technologies, and 30% from exports of components, will be allocated to a special state budget fund dedicated to developing Ukraine’s defense industry. The minimum contract value for finished products is UAH 15 million. This threshold does not apply to components. The mechanism will operate throughout the period of martial law and establishes transparent rules for exports to partner countries under the Drone Deal framework. At the same time, the needs of Ukraine’s Defense Forces remain the absolute priority. Exports will be authorized only if a manufacturer can demonstrate its ability to fulfill both state defense orders and export contracts simultaneously. Authorization may be denied if the Ministry of Defense or another state customer intends to procure the same products for Ukraine’s defense needs, or if the item is included on the list of critical defense goods. The Ministry of Defense will update the list of critical goods and technologies every quarter, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will maintain the list of countries eligible to receive Ukrainian defense exports. The new mechanism also protects Ukrainian technologies. They will be transferred without assigning intellectual property rights and will remain subject to controls on their use and re-export. Today, more than 50% of the weapons used on the battlefield are made in Ukraine, and Ukrainian defense manufacturers continue to expand production of drones, electronic warfare systems, ammunition, components, and other critical defense technologies.

We need some fireworks here. 🎆 The Yamal Cross is one of Russia’s most critical gas transmission hubs. • 17 major high-pressure trunk pipelines intersect here. • The Yamalo-Nenets region produces around 90% of Russia’s natural gas. • Much of that gas passes through this single junction before heading across Russia and toward export routes. • Because of the Arctic permafrost, many of the pipelines are laid above ground or in shallow trenches, making the hub unusually exposed.

A fire "suddenly" erupted at a power substation in the Moscow suburbs, and some people have no water either. Officials reported a technical failure, but locals say the power vanished right after a drone visit, as UAVs were being intercepted on the approaches to Moscow.

💥 Sberbank’s CEO admits Russian banks dream of the war ending—because 13 billion rubles are withdrawn daily. Fear of economic collapse now outweighs fear of Putin. As Russians panic, even insiders see the end of the regime. #RussiaIsCollapsing #RussiaEconomy #StandWithUkraine #MakeRussiaSmallAgain

Russia has just dropped seven guided bombs on Kharkiv. Dozens injured. 15-year-old boy killed.

Japanese State Minister for Foreign Affairs Ayano Kunimitsu and Yoshihiko Okabe (Chairman of the Ukraine Research Association & Honorary Consul of Ukraine in Kobe). Both proudly wearing traditional Ukrainian vyshyvankas. 🇯🇵🇺🇦 🫶

A video circulating online reportedly shows mercenaries from Peru, Zimbabwe, and Burundi who fought for Russia and were captured in Ukraine's Kharkiv region. According to the Center for Countering Disinformation, more than 28,000 foreign recruits serving in the Russian army have already been identified. The Kremlin is using them to compensate for its battlefield losses. Many are lured with fake job offers, have their documents confiscated, and are then sent into "meat assaults" with little or no training.

Anton Gerashchenko @Gerashchenko_en

6 months ago

In the video, a Russian humiliates an African mercenary with an anti-tank mine strapped to his torso and says that he is about to "run and hop through the woods."

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