Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy

Nobody has tried because it does not make sense until north donetsk is captured. 2022 showed that bypassing fortresses with mechanized units is a bad idea… For the time being it is a matter of operational priorities, and the infiltration tactics are tailored to the capture of fortress cities. After that, we shall see what both sides come up with

Important to point out that since the beginning of the war, Russian forces have always outmanoeuvred Ukrainians’ in siege warfare. From Marioupol to Kostantinivka. Because a well conducted siege defense is where you break the enemy’s offensive. Once, you may have been overwhelmed, but 6 major sieges lost (Marioupol, Sieverodonetsk, Bakhmut, Pokrovsk, Avdeevka, and now Kostantinivka) demonstrates significant gap in operational warfare. As mentioned in another analysis in reply, losses ratio for most of those battles was far from favorable to the defender if we refer to OSINT data. The fortress cities are slowing down Russian advances as they should, but the level of fortifications should have broken the offensive tempo entirely. Note: Kupyansk, Huliaipole or Marinka not listed as they did not fall follow a siege. #UkraineRussiaWar #Warfare bbc.com/news/articles/…

Yes the issue of gerans is they need preprogrammed targets and cannot be used on individual moving vehicles. We have to wait for the russian starlink variant, Rassvet, which is coming online gradually (since march). For the purpose of this war and coverage it does not require to match starlink’s.

In the series "Russians do not have mid-range strike capability." This is 40 km behind Ukrainian lines. Around 7-8 trucks destroyed. It seems that since Patriot interceptor stocks are low and most ballistic missiles can get through air defenses, Russians are increasingly repurposing some Geran drones for mid-range strikes to target logistics and energy grid infrastructure.

Lost Armour @lostarmour

17 hours ago

Объективный контроль вчерашнего удара телеуправляемыми "Геранями" по грузовой автомобильной технике в Хортицком районе Запорожья. Каждая фура на подконтрольной врагу территории - это потенциальная пусковая платформа (t.me/lost_armour/96…) для дальнобойных БПЛА самолетного

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Hi Clement, I disagree on this until a real offensive in the plains takes place to show otherwise. While we have many urban and siege battle examples, there has not been a determined offensive in deep open terrain since 2023 by either side, with the exception of the Velikha Novosilka-Huliaipole push by Russian forces last fall. It was rather opportunistic and exploited intelligence showing undermanned territorial brigades defending an overextended frontline, with limited firepower and no reserves, which were consumed in Pokrovsk. Basically 600 km² taken with a couple of MRBs… Everything since winter is a large skirmish battle, because the axis is not summer priority. However, whomever wins this skirmish fight, if Russians, will fragilise Orikhiv for a fall push. In this sector’s current configuration, there remains a fortress town: Orikhiv. My take is that, as for the past 2 years, Russian command is focused on taking Donetsk oblast, which is attritional siege and urban grinding warfare. However, they are stockpiling armor in large volumes, both to restore conventional deterrence and eventually to launch an offensive in the Pontic plains of Dnipropetrovsk oblast and behind Sloviansk/Kramatorsk. If this happens, we will be able to really assess how drone tactics play out in open terrain.

@joematzam @Geigerzaehler I do not think so. It certainly aims at a better negociated cease fire before the end of the year, especially to avoid another winter strike campaign on the Energy infrastructure.

ReArm is mostly financed from member states budget, so it is the same as direct financing. Basically 800bn€ over 5 years. Hard to tell what really goes to Ukraine. EDF is <8bn€ total, will not suffice. As per numbers not working, yes and no. Ukraine debt is close to 130% of GDP now, and 40% of the remaining population’s only income is welfare. There will be no viable economy post war.

The latest analysis from the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW) concludes, as expected, that the recent announcement of high (€7,000/month) salaries for foreign recruits in the Ukrainian Armed Forces cannot be funded under the current economic situation. Such a scheme would cost approximately €6–7 billion per year for a force of 80,000 foreign recruits. Needless to say, this would come on top of the salary increases promised to Ukrainian soldiers. There are currently no identified funding sources for this initiative. Moreover, Ukraine’s state budget is already projected to face a €30 billion shortfall this year, and NATO and the EU countries are actively seeking additional bilateral commitments to avoid covering the gap themselves. However, that is not the most significant revelation. The report also highlights several official data points that have largely gone under the radar amid the recent information warfare surrounding the conflict. A few notable examples are below: « 7% of those mobilised were entitled to a deferment or exemption from service on health grounds. As recently as July 2025, the Ministry of Defence also indirectly acknowledged that 10% of recruits – at least 3,000 per month – entered military service through coercive measures, including the so-called busification campaign » There is little surprise here. This follows Resolution 560 of 16 May 2024, which authorizes summonses to be served directly in public spaces to eligible men, providing the legal framework for coercive mobilization. (For a country at war, this is legal and understandable) It is often claimed that “busification” concerns only draft evaders or men who failed to register. This is not correct and should not be used to deflect from the reality of the mobilization apparatus deployed to sustain the AFU along a 1,000 km frontline. « data from the Verkhovna Rada indicate that by June this year the number of people permanently disabled as a result of combat since the start of the war had reached 600,000 » The number is staggering. By any measure, it is consistent with assessments suggesting that both sides have suffered broadly comparable overall losses. It is now widely acknowledged from OSINT-based assessments that this was the case in 2022, and casualty levels may have remained similarly close in subsequent years. It is assumed that this figure includes all forms of permanent disability, both physical and psychological. « In addition, according to Economy Minister Oleksii Sobolev, 1.3 million people eligible for mobilisation benefit from deferments or exemptions from service, many of which are obtained through corruption. This figure has increased by 300,000 over the past year. » Combined with the figures above, this reinforces the picture of an ageing force in declining health with an increasingly poor personnel composition. It represents a stark shift from the younger, more experienced, volunteer force of the early years of the war. Attritional warfare has taken an enormous toll and increasingly threatens the long-term viability of the Ukrainian state after the war. The widespread use of bribes to avoid mobilization also serves as a reminder of the scale of the challenge Ukraine still faces in tackling corruption, both at the highest levels and in everyday life. Thanks to @franfran2424 for sharing. #UkraineRussiaWar osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/…

@gato_do_mato @pa_coyote94151 Exact. If the intent was to compare rhe current Ukrainian doctrine with what the Russians did vs Napoleon then it is also heavily misleading.

Yes, I see only 3 options: - Heavy back channel funding has been ramped up. But the amounts seem impossible to conceal. - Situation is dire, and Ukraine is basically all-in until winter to get the least worse cease fire deal… - The EU loan of 90bn€ will be spent as needed, but will not last 2 years. At current pace of expenditures, 18 months at best.

@J1MMYJAMJAM Range is not an issue for Geran drones. The issue is cost. Ukraine developed those intermediate drones, cheaper, lower payload but enough for vehicles (not for hard structures. Most bridges hit can be repaired, those are surface damages)

@Geigerzaehler Yes it can ramp-up certainly. But Russia can still escalate as well, with conventional means. The war could indeed become way uglier than it is now

I would not be so sure. Back channel financing has limits, and the official ones must answer to elections and budget constraints. The 3 countries currently covering most of the cost cannot afford another 40bn€ per year. (Current gap + additional costs from this) Not with state budget deficit of 5-6% already. This is why the 90bn€ package is a « loan » officially.

A look at #OSINT casualty estimates per battle paints a different picture from the commonly claimed 10:1 or 5:1 ratio in favor of the defender.

Delwin | Military Theorist @DelwinStrategy

8 months ago

[STRATEGIC ANALYSIS] Part I – POKROVSK, The Fall of the Corridor Russian forces have now been geolocated controlling Rodynske, with confirmation of their presence in Krasnyi Lyman. This narrows the Ukrainian exit corridor to roughly 5 km, leaving a single road through Rivne

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@iswarfair But still you get your data wrong. Artillery data is open source and easy to find articles saying Ukraine is losing in this area, no later than yesterday. None of the people you listed are saying half of what you claimed.

Ukraine loses 2 to 3 times more artillery pieces than Russia. But « better at counter battery »… I do not think so. About troop quality, they recently admitted also that 20% of new recruits are unfit for service. Inform yourself better, I have no idea where you get those incorrect information, but this is not even what Ukrainian officers and journalists are saying

Pour enrichir les actuels débats autour de l'artillerie : "The 🇺🇦 drone pilot told the @BBC that while his colleagues were targeting 🇷🇺's infantry, enemy crews were not: 'For such tasks, they use artillery, multiple rocket launchers, military aviation.'" bbc.com/news/articles/…