DeVaughn Station @IntelAdvocate

It’s hard to understate how catastrophic a full blown war in Ethiopia is at this time. Combine it with the genocide in Sudan, the wars in Yemen and Somalia and you have a humanitarian disaster of biblical proportions. It could have been avoided, but the world simply did not care

In a major setback for Ethiopia’s Federal Government 🇪🇹, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has reportedly taken control of the three main airports under federal control in Tigray: Shire, Mekelle and Axum. Ethiopian Airlines has suspended flights to the region.

Rich Tedd 🛰 ✈️ @AfriMEOSINT

3 days ago

In a major development, seven Ethiopian 🇪🇹 armed groups, including factions from Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, Ogaden, Afar and Benishangul-Gumuz, have announced a new alliance against the federal government led by Abiy Ahmed, aimed at paving the way for a transitional administration.

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There are reports that Tigrayan forces seized Tigray airports with fighting reported in Tigray, Afar & Amhara. Each side accuses the other of starting the offensive. The 2022 ceasefire is under severe strain. Civilians at risk, which is why I hope for restraint, verification of claims, and talks before this widens. #Ethiopia CNN Source: cnn.com/2026/09/23/afr…

This week has been significant for FININT operations, especially regarding Iran. OFAC targeted BitBank (Zanjani network) for alleged BTC transfers to the IRGC and Hormuz transit collections. Concurrently, there was a FinCEN Exchange Event focused on Iran’s banking and procurement facilitators. Additionally, the Southern District of New York is pursuing a separate case to obtain approximately $61 million in oil-sale USDT linked to a $1.5 billion unhosted-wallet cluster, referred to as “Entity A”. These events highlight the interconnectedness of shadow banking, tanker tolls, and digital assets as a single collection challenge. OFAC Source: home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel… SDNY Source: theblock.co/news/regulatio…

@EYakoby They likely will not directly engage in the ground but may help regarding intel, logistics, and providing some defensive equipment. I don’t think they will be on the ground because of the delicate balance they have with Iran.

It will be interesting to see what comes next. Retreating makes it seem like we failed our goals in the region, and the next conflict will be harder. Leaning in could cost soldiers and affect global perceptions. Staying as we are wont change the status quo and likely just extends the duration of suffering. It’s a mess.

It’s a smart idea to ensure that the next leaders understand their complex geopolitical position with high-level information. It’s also noteworthy because some people would do the opposite so they appear more interested and informed than the next guy for selfish reasons. Hopefully this meeting helps.

I’m not arguing that states shouldn’t be allowed to conduct tests or that North Korea is an isolated issue compared to others. However, I firmly believe that all possible measures should be taken to prevent or minimize the ecological impacts, which are detrimental to both our environment and our safety. My goal is to create a better world for everyone. 6/6

Increasing the number of tests leads to more of everything: more wreckage, more handling of poisonous plants, and a higher likelihood of a failure releasing unburned fuel near people. As a result, the environment is treated as collateral damage in weapons programs, but the people who live downstream are not consulted. 5/6

I’m not an ecologist; I observe militaries, diplomats, and supply lines. However, you don’t need a lab coat to notice that every missile test leaves a trace. It could be fuel, metal, a crater, or even silence where monitoring should be. Currently, I’ve been investigating this phenomenon on the Korean Peninsula.🧵1/6

If anything, we should be leaning in to protect and work with our Asian allies. Retreating or downscaling at a time where Russia, North Korea, and China are all looking at expansion of military capabilities, isn’t the best idea. We’ve already done enough damage to our strategic partnerships recently.

Useful test for analyzing this region: If there is no written obligation to fight for the other party, it is not an ally. It is a partner. Mixing those words makes the peninsula look more organized than it is. The Korean people deserve truth, sovereignty, and safety.

That is why the Korea ally list looks short if you use the legal definition. South Korea: one formal mutual-defense ally, the United States (1953). North Korea: a 1961 mutual-assistance treaty with China, plus a 2024 strategic partnership with Russia that includes mutual military assistance language. Sources: China–DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, 11 July 1961, Art. 2 Russia–DPRK Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed 18 June 2024, in force Dec 2024

What exists now is layered cooperation, not collective defense. U.S.–ROK–Japan missile-data sharing and Freedom Edge exercises matter. They are still not Article 5. A trilateral meeting is not a mutual defense treaty.

NATO is a multilateral treaty: an attack on one is treated as an attack on all. The U.S. system in Asia is the opposite. It is a hub-and-spoke model. Washington signed separate bilateral treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. Those spokes do not automatically defend each other. Sources: U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, 1 Oct 1953 (in force Nov 1954) Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States, 19 Jan 1960 U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, 1951 ANZUS, 1951

The United States also preferred bilateral control. Separate treaties are easier to manage, easier to condition, and easier to keep from turning into a regional commitment Washington did not want to underwrite.

There are structural reasons it stayed that way. • Japan–Korea history still blocks a real Tokyo–Seoul defense treaty. • Threats are not the same. Seoul’s first problem is North Korea. Tokyo’s first problems are China and missiles. Manila’s first problem is the South China Sea. • China is the top trading partner for most of the region, including South Korea. A NATO-style bloc would force a choice Seoul has spent decades avoiding. • ASEAN states treat non-alignment as policy, not a mood.

Here are some thoughts and observations from the research that I’ve been compiling, but I am not done yet. East Asia does not have an Asian NATO. That is not an accident. Most of what gets called an “alliance” on the peninsula is a partnership, an exercise calendar, or a trade relationship. Formal mutual defense is rare on purpose.