𝕽𝖊𝖋𝖔𝖗𝖒𝖊𝖉 𝕽𝖊𝖙𝖗𝖎𝖊𝖛𝖆𝖑 🕊️ @RefRetrieval

@Duke456521 @_DHDS Because I can provide proof of how the reformed understood it.

If the ordination of all events is such an ordination that doesn’t make God the author of sin, then it must be a permissive decree regarding sin. All of the non-modern reformed authors I’ve read understand this. What Calvinists on X think is irrelevant unless they provide proof against it. I have scores of quotes of Reformed authors understanding a permissive decree regarding sin because that’s the way it has always been intended and understood. WCF 3.1 literally tells you this by the qualification “yet so, as thereby…” That qualification then naturally means God ordained to permit sin, not to effect it. Quotes are helpful because it shows what the Reformed actually said and they were much deeper thinkers and more reliable sources than the average TulipBro on X and the quotes usually address specific points in much better depth than a comment on X.

Oz Marquez 🕊️ @OzMarquezz

a month ago

A problem these anti-calvinists have is that they often impose their own definitions onto our terms. The intro to the Minutes of Westminster quotes Crawford as being representative of the Westminster Assembly regarding the term “decree” and how it’s understood in WCF 3.1.

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God’s Eternal Decree Made Simple!

@_DHDS Quotes do that.

I gave a fairly straightforward explanation. It’s as simple as simple as can be. The quotes are much more helpful. This one in particular (OP) actually already answered your question. I assume the problem is that you’re not familiar with the debate about premotion/predetermination.

Suárez responding to the objection that conditioned future free acts are foreknown apart from God’s decree, arguing that they presuppose God’s permissive or concurring decree, but not an efficacious predetermining decree of the created will. “Second, one must consider that God’s free decree, taken generally, is often confused with his efficaciously predefining or predetermining decree. And because we say that God foreknows futures before a predetermining decree, or that they can be future without such a decree, it is immediately inferred — or attributed to us — that we assert that conditioned futures are foreknown independently of the decree of God’s will. But this is not a good inference, because it argues negatively from a particular to a universal. The defect can easily be detected. For sin is foreknown as future not only before a predetermining decree, or before a decree absolutely predefining — or, what is the same, predestining — even the act of the sin itself. It is also foreknown as future without such a decree. Nevertheless, it will not be future without some decree of God’s will, according to Augustine’s statement in the Enchiridion, chapter 95: “Nothing happens unless the Omnipotent wills it to happen, either by permitting it to happen or by himself doing it” (St. Augustine, Enchiridion 95). Therefore, to know conditioned futures, it is necessary that some decree of God be placed in the condition itself. Yet it need not be so absolute that it predetermines the created will. For the necessity of such a decree would be repugnant to the freedom of the created will with respect to the free use of other acts, or with respect to free omission — or, what amounts to the same thing, with respect to freedom and specification. And, with respect to the same future act by force of such a decree, it would be repugnant to freedom with respect to exercise; nor would it be foreknown as contingent, but as necessarily consequent upon an antecedent supposition. Besides this, there follows the absurdity concerning sins: that in a similar decree they would be foreknown as future, at least with respect to the very acts from which malice is inseparable. How great this absurdity is has often been emphasized by us, and it will be repeated a thousand times and treated very broadly in the course of this work, because the matter is of the highest importance and brings great light to this subject.” —Francisco Suárez, On Grace, or On God the Savior, Justifier, and Helper of Free Will Through His Grace.

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Idk what that razor thing is. A decree to predetermine is a decree to determine the created will to elicit that particular act. “If I decree to determine this will to choose X, it will choose X.” A hypothetical decree is the supposition that God wills to concur with the act, not determine the will. “If I decree to concur with this person under these conditions, he will choose X.” Both sides agree that some divine decree is presupposed in the hypothesis of conditional futures. The disagreement is what kind of decree is included. The Dominican says the hypothesis includes a decree of predetermining premotion while Suárez says it includes only a decree of concurrence and not one determining the will.

@_DHDS It still presupposes a hypothetical decree to concur and there is no futurity apart from a decree.

@_DHDS “Without such a decree” is referring to a decree of predetermination of a particular act.

“We concede the equivalence which is made there between things future absolutely and things future under a condition, as far as this point goes: just as nothing is absolutely future unless God either wills it to be done or wills to permit it to be done, so in conditionals nothing is future from the hypothesis unless God either would will it to be done or would will to permit it to be done.” —Francisco Suárez, On Grace, or On God the Savior, Justifier, and Helper of Free Will Through His Grace.

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Suárez responding to the objection that God’s foreknowledge of conditional future free acts requires a prior predetermining decree, arguing instead that God’s knowledge of simple intelligence presupposes only His simultaneous concurrence, not a predetermining motion of the will. “First, then, one must observe that many arguments of this sort proceed from this: that they do not distinguish between God’s decree as preceding, according to the order of reason, in God himself, and God’s decree as objectively included in the hypothesis of the conditioned future event. Yet these things are different, both as was touched upon above and as is manifest in itself. For God, through the knowledge of simple intelligence, which precedes every free decree, knows that if fire is applied to wood, it will heat it. Yet in that hypothesis God’s decree willing to concur is necessarily included, because without it such an effect could not follow, even with the condition posited. Therefore, this is included in the hypothesis: “If fire is applied, and God does not suspend his concurrence…” This is not expressed because it is presupposed as included from a kind of natural debt. And in free works, even works of grace, God foreknows by the same knowledge that if such a man has such an inspiration, with such or such a motion, at such a time, he will consent. For knowledge precedes every free decree in God himself. Nevertheless, it does not exclude a free decree according to the mode of the possible, and as included in the object. On this point, under these words, even the adversaries must agree, since such foreknowledge is necessary so that God can will and choose the efficacious means of predestination. But the difference lies in the mode of the decree or motion. The adversaries wish that, in that hypothesis, there must be included a motion predetermining the created will, or this conditional: “If I efficaciously will this will to consent, and from this will call it,” and so on. But we say that such a decree, included in that condition in this way, is not necessary. Rather, a decree of concurring simultaneously after such a vocation is sufficient, so that the sense of the conditional is this: “If I give this person such an inspiration or vocation, and will to offer him my concurrence, or concomitant aid, such an act will follow.” From this it follows that such an act is never known as future under a condition without some free decree of God, even if, according to our mode of knowing and speaking, such foreknowledge is prior in God to the quasi-eliciting of such a free decree of God.” —Francisco Suárez, On Grace, or On God the Savior, Justifier, and Helper of Free Will Through His Grace.

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@rootcausesleuth x.com/refretrieval/s…

𝕽𝖊𝖋𝖔𝖗𝖒𝖊𝖉 𝕽𝖊𝖙𝖗𝖎𝖊𝖛𝖆𝖑 🕊️ @RefRetrieval

9 months ago

“…after the fall there remained in the intellect of man not only the light of natural wisdom for understanding the things of this life, but also certain little sparks, as it were, of the knowledge and notice of God the Creator, which the holy Apostle, in Romans 1:19, 20, says

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@rootcausesleuth x.com/refretrieval/s…

𝕽𝖊𝖋𝖔𝖗𝖒𝖊𝖉 𝕽𝖊𝖙𝖗𝖎𝖊𝖛𝖆𝖑 🕊️ @RefRetrieval

2 months ago

Reformed professor Paul Testard teaches that the “blindness” of fallen man does not mean the destruction of the natural faculties of intellect, reason, or conscience, nor an utter absence of all knowledge of God and the good. Fallen man still retains the natural power of

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@rootcausesleuth x.com/refretrieval/s…

𝕽𝖊𝖋𝖔𝖗𝖒𝖊𝖉 𝕽𝖊𝖙𝖗𝖎𝖊𝖛𝖆𝖑 🕊️ @RefRetrieval

2 years ago

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@AngAesthetics @logos_asarkos Have you read Le Blanc’s view on foreknowledge? There’s guys like him and others (Gomarus, Crocius et al.) who posited knowledge of hypothetical conditionals as part of God’s natural knowledge. youtu.be/kqSYYJCtzCc?is… youtu.be/kqSYYJCtzCc?is…

@GeoChonker x.com/ozmarquezz/sta…

Oz Marquez 🕊️ @OzMarquezz

4 weeks ago

John Davenant on efficacious grace, graciously exciting, directing, and strengthening the will unto faith, causing it to act freely rather than by irresistible force.

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"For although in the point or doctrine of justification, the Gospel is content with faith alone; yet in the subject and doctrine of sanctification, it demands the fruits of faith, and a life worthy of the Gospel. But it behoves us, if we are desirous of living agreeably to the Gospel, to listen to the Gospel, not only when it proclaims gratuitous justification through faith; but also when it requires due holiness of life from the justified. Moreover, justification by faith alone does not yield any consolation to such as voluntarily persevere in wicked works; for though such persons may imagine that they are justified, they cannot in reality believe it." ~John Davenant, Treatise on Justification

Suárez explaining that every saving act of the human will is wholly from God’s grace even is physical premotion is not present. “Objection 2: If God's physical premotion is not present, it follows that man in the business of salvation has something proper which he has not received from grace, namely the operation of his will. I respond: I deny the conclusion. Because whatever is in man operating well, conferring to salvation, all of this is had from God: namely antecedent helps of grace, infused habits, their acts proceeding from God immediately concurring, and the effects of the acts.”

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“God wills that you should neither receive his word nor his grace in vain: say not therefore when he calls upon you to repent, and incites you thereunto, that his meaning is you should not repent. … The goodness of the action which God commands, the word commanding, and the Spirit exciting thereunto, are good proofs unto you that God means (that is, likes, desires, wills) that you should do those good things which he requires:” —John Davenant, Animadversions

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