Frans Faase @fjfaase

My God!

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Jeff @_Jeffery0

10 hours ago

“Do You Support Israel’s Right to Exist?” Mehdi Hasan FIRES BACK Mehdi Hasan: I've been debating hardcore Zionists, Israeli supporters of Israel, for years. And the conversation always comes back to one talking point: “Do you, or do you not support Israel’s right to exist?” If

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@z3r0_burn @SenMarkKelly The EU has more military personal than the USA and three time the reserve personel and more available for combat. The EU navy has three times the number of ships than the USA. Together with Ukraine we produce more drones than the USA.

So many things have simply vanished from my life because of the war. But what I miss most is having a future. Life still goes on, but what used to be a river feels like a stagnant pond. "Tomorrow" seems like an uncertain concept, not even guaranteed to arrive, and planning feels entirely vain. ​I often feel like a shadow of my former self, as if a part of me was left behind in the past. Yet deep inside, beneath all the sorrow and grief, I know I'm still here. None of this was my choice, but I am still me, and I just need to hold on and get through this.

@Cultuurfilosoof Als je het nodig vind om je met deze uitspraak als intellectueel te kwalificeren als reactie op de kritiek die je kreeg voor het verwijl letterlijk herhalen van Poetins 'vredesplan', dan diskwalificeer je je alleen maar meer als intellectueel.

Former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson says a German government official told him before Russia’s full-scale invasion that it would be better if Ukraine lost quickly so it would all be over. Johnson recalled the official saying: “If it has to happen, it would be better if it happened quickly and the Ukrainians lost. And it was all over.” He said the episode reflected Berlin and Paris’s failed strategy toward Russia after Crimea. #Ukraine

@SenMarkKelly He totally seems to forget that many of the military bases in Europe are there for the benefit of the USA. Without those bases he could not have bombed Iran. I think we in Europe should as quickly as possible reduce our military reliance on the USA and closes those bases.

Nog een keer voor de mensen achterin: Kremlin zegt mbt Oekraine-oorlog: "Donbas moet bij ons, leger van Oekraine moet afslanken, geen NAVO lidmaatschap en Zelenskiy moet weg" Wat zei Jelle op WNL? "Donbas moet bij Rusland, leger van Oekraine moet afslanken, geen NAVO lidmaatschap en Zelenskiy moet weg" Van al die voorvechters van vrijheid van meningsuiting mogen we dan niet zeggen dat de filosoof gewoon Kremlin standpunten heeft zitten verkondigen. Als je academische vrijheid hebt om exacte retoriek van Poetin te herhalen op de buis, dan moet je ook ready zijn om erop aangesproken te worden dat "jouw" voorstellen eigenlijk vrijbrief zijn voor de capitulatie van een soeverein land.

Mijn inzending voor de ontwerpwedstrijd van NS voor een nieuwe spoorkaart van Nederland! De uitdaging was om alle 400 stations en tientallen lijnen van verschillende vervoerders overzichtelijk op te nemen. Een paar ontwerpkeuzes hieronder:

I Questioned Israel: 48 Hours Later I Was Sacked @SangitaMyska

The main source of the money Russia uses to wage its criminal war against Ukraine is oil revenue generated through the shadow fleet. ‼️Some European, primarily Greek, companies transport Russian oil, supporting Russia’s war economy. The price cap regime was introduced in 2022 to reduce Russia’s revenues while preventing a sharp decline in global oil supply. But today it has become a more harmful instrument that not only fails to reduce Russian profits, but also allows some European shipping company owners to make money at the expense of European security. Let’s look at the numbers. In July 2026, vessels linked to G7 countries and their partners carried 36.2% of Russia’s seaborne crude oil exports. This was the fourth consecutive month of growth and the highest figure since July 2025. ‼️Greek companies were the main source of this increase: in July, they transported 26.4 million barrels of Russian oil, compared with 24.9 million in June. This was the highest monthly volume in almost three years. Greek shipowners have already become an important part of Russia’s export system. In May 2026, vessels controlled by them carried almost 15% of Russia’s total seaborne crude oil exports. Back in April 2025, Reuters found that 15 of the 25 tankers loading Urals crude at key Russian ports were managed by Greek companies. These included Dynacom Tankers, Minerva Marine, and TMS Tankers. The scale of this business is substantial. According to a Financial Times estimate published on July 7, 2026, Greek shipping companies earned at least $3.8 billion from transporting Russian oil over the previous three years. This figure covers only approximately 389 million barrels for which freight-rate data was available. Another roughly 153 million barrels transported by Greek companies were not included in the estimate. This means the documented volume amounts to at least 542 million barrels. Several Greek companies are particularly prominent. Dynacom Tankers Management, founded by George Prokopiou, earned at least $915 million from transporting Russian oil since July 2023, according to the FT. Olympic Shipping and Management, linked to the Onassis Group, earned at least $404 million. Stealth Maritime and Polembros Shipping earned more than $200 million each. Minerva Marine, linked to Andreas Martinos, was among the companies that returned to transporting Urals crude in 2025. All of these companies say they operate within the sanctions regime. This is an important clarification: the mere transportation of Russian oil does not constitute a sanctions violation. Under current EU rules, European companies can transport Russian oil, insure vessels, and provide brokerage and financial services as long as the oil is sold below the established price cap. Since February 1, 2026, the EU price cap for Russian crude oil has been $44.10 per barrel. In other words, the problem is not only sanctions evasion. Some of this business is explicitly permitted by the sanctions regime itself. ▪️ The first step for the EU is obvious: it needs to move from a price cap to a complete ban on European maritime services for Russian oil. European companies should be prohibited from transporting, chartering, managing, insuring, reinsuring, brokering, financing, certifying, or providing technical maintenance for Russian oil shipments regardless of the price of the cargo. This would immediately eliminate the legal channel through which Dynacom, Olympic, Stealth, Polembros, Minerva, and others can currently operate with Russian oil. ▪️ The second step is to audit the largest European operators of Russia’s oil exports. This should include a full audit of voyages by Dynacom Tankers, Olympic Shipping and Management, Stealth Maritime, Polembros Shipping, Minerva Marine, and other major operators. For each voyage, authorities should establish the vessel and IMO number, owner and beneficial owner, manager, charterer, Russian supplier, cargo volume, declared price, freight rate, loading port, final destination, insurer, P&I club, attestation provider, as well as any possible ship-to-ship transfers and AIS anomalies. ▪️ The third step is to change the sanctions criteria themselves. The EU should be able to impose restrictions not only for specific violations of the price cap, but also for systematic and economically significant support of Russia’s energy exports. A company that has earned hundreds of millions of dollars over years by maintaining Russia’s oil logistics should be assessed differently from an operator that made a single isolated voyage. At the same time, the criteria must be clear and sufficiently well-founded to withstand judicial review. ▪️ The fourth step is to remove the financial incentive. If transporting Russian oil provides a 30-40% premium on freight rates, the EU should make this business less profitable. Companies that continue to systematically transport Russian oil could lose access to certain forms of European insurance, government financial guarantees, export credit, port services, or other forms of public support. The calculation needs to change: the additional profit from a Russian voyage should be lower than the expected regulatory and financial costs. ▪️ The fifth step is tighter control over tanker sales. The sale of old oil tankers to high-risk third countries should require disclosure of the ultimate beneficial owner, source of financing, future manager, flag, insurer, and intended area of operation. For the riskiest transactions, simple notification is not enough - prior approval should be required. Particular attention should be paid to sales of old tankers to newly established companies in jurisdictions regularly used by the shadow fleet. ▪️ The sixth step is to establish real accountability for the transfer of vessels into the shadow fleet. If a tanker sold from the EU begins transporting Russian oil a few months later, regulators should determine whether the seller could have foreseen its end use, whether the buyer was a shell company, whether the sale price was abnormally high, who the intermediary was, and how quickly the owner, manager, flag, and insurer changed. Liability should depend on intent, knowledge, gross negligence, or failure to carry out adequate due diligence. ▪️ The seventh step is to sanction not just the vessels, but the entire network. The EU has already placed more than 630 shadow-fleet vessels on its sanctions lists, but this approach remains reactive. A vessel can quickly be resold, reflagged, or assigned a new manager or formal owner. The focus therefore needs to shift toward beneficial owners, commercial managers, ISM managers, crewing companies, brokers, insurers, flag registries, financial structures, and permanent ship-to-ship hubs. ▪️ The eighth step is to accelerate the sanctioning of individual tankers. The EU should not have to wait months for large political packages. It needs a mechanism for regular technical updates to the sanctions lists based on predefined criteria: transporting oil above the cap, AIS manipulation, false flagging, suspicious ship-to-ship transfers, lack of reliable insurance, repeated ownership changes through opaque SPVs, or work for already-sanctioned Russian entities. ▪️ The ninth step is to strengthen maritime enforcement together with the United Kingdom and EU coastal states. The detention of the Smyrtos in June 2026 showed that sanctions become significantly more effective when they have physical consequences. Where there is a legal basis - from false flagging to lack of adequate insurance or sanctions violations - inspections, detentions, and denial of port services should be used more actively. ▪️ The tenth step is to bring the issue of Greek shipping to the political level. According to the FT, citing European diplomats, Greece and Cyprus have repeatedly opposed a stricter price cap during internal EU negotiations. This creates an obvious contradiction: Europe is trying to reduce Russia’s oil revenues, while companies from EU member states are earning substantial revenues by maintaining the very system Europe is trying to dismantle. ‼️This is no longer just a matter of shipping policy. It is a matter of European collective security.

Funny how no one asked russia to halt strikes on Ukrainian civilians.

@YourAnonNews I fear your democracy is already lost now that the GOP has decided that an autocracy is better than a democracy and will support an autocratic leader till the end.

@WNLVandaag Ik wist niet dat ze in Rusland nog geld over hadden om buitenlandse influencers te betalen. Je staat hier letterlijk het 'vredesplan' van Poetin op te lispelen inclusief demilitarisering van Oekraïne, zodat hij over drie jaar een derde poging kan doen.

Here is a small reminder for everyone spreading the pro-russian narrative about "revenge for Wildberries," as well as for any normal person who doesn't follow the war closely and feels confused. Pay attention to the dates! ​Russia struck the Amstor Shopping Mall in Kremenchuk on June 27, 2022, with cruise missiles in the middle of the day while up to 1,000 people were inside. 21 people died, and over 70 were injured. ​Russia struck the Epicentr Hypermarket in Kharkiv on May 25, 2024. It was a weekend afternoon, and around 200 civilians and staff were inside shopping for home supplies. The blast sparked a high-temperature chemical and building-material fire. We had to use DNA testing to identify victims. 19 were killed, including children, and 46 were injured. ​Russia struck the Kostiantynivka Central Market and surrounding shops at least twice: September 6, 2023, and August 9, 2024. Both strikes targeted dense retail zones crowded with shoppers during morning or early afternoon hours. 17 were killed and 32 injured in the September 2023 strike, and 14 were killed and 44 injured in the August 2024 strike on the Eko-Market. ​Russia struck the Nova Poshta Sorting Terminal in Korotych, Kharkiv region, on October 21, 2023. Late at night, while employees were unloading civilian mail, parcels, and humanitarian packages, two S-300 missiles hit a location where missiles arrive faster than they can be detected. The 8 people killed stood no chance, 15 people were injured. ​Russians continued to strike Nova Poshta in Korotych on January 13, 2026, killing 4 people and injuring 6; on July 19, 2026, killing 4 people and injuring 19; and on August 2, 2026, killing a driver. Among all the attacks listed, only the latest two occurred after the beginning of Ukrainian strikes on Wildberries. ​Russia struck the ATB Supermarket & Retail Square in Kherson on May 3, 2023. Hitting civilian shopping infrastructure during daytime hours, they trapped shoppers inside the burning grocery hall. 23 people were killed across Kherson that day: 4 inside the ATB supermarket, 1 inside the Epicentr store, and others at nearby transport stops and shops. ​Russia struck the Kherson Central City Market on October 1, 2024. Around 9:00 AM, artillery rounds landed directly in active outdoor market stalls. 7 were killed and 3 were injured. ​Finally, Russia struck Kramatorsk Central Station on April 8, 2022, during an active civilian evacuation. A Tochka-U ballistic missile hit packed evacuation platforms, killing 63 civilians, including 9 children, and injuring over 150. They also struck Chaplyne Railway Station on August 24, 2022, where an Iskander missile hit passenger trains and adjacent cars, killing 25 civilians and burning passenger carriages. ​This is a tiny fraction of Russian strikes on Ukrainian retail chains, markets, and civilian transportation infrastructure during the full-scale invasion. A tiny, little fraction! So when you brain-dead amoebas write "revenge for Wildberries," think again. Russia was bombing Ukraine all these years, long before our attacks on Wildberries, and they will continue regardless.

ZELENSKYY: The more North Korean strikes there are here in Ukraine, the more their missiles or soldiers are used, the more they correct their shortcomings and blind spots, the greater the danger will later be for Japan, South Korea, Philippines and other countries in the region.

On my way into Donbas, there’s constant explosions on the side of the road. Russians are intensifying their attacks on the entire region right now. People sometimes ask why Ukrainian refugees ‘don’t return home’ - it’s because this is happening every single hour

I received reports from Sergii Koretskyi, Mykhailo Drapatyi, and Viktor Mykyta on the consequences of Russian strikes on Odesa, Kharkiv, Pavlohrad, and our other regions. In Odesa and the region, repair work is ongoing to restore power supply to people after a brutal strike on the energy sector. All necessary services are involved, and the work will continue for as long as needed. Residential buildings and the port were also damaged overnight. This is, in particular, how Russia is systematically waging war against global food security. As of now, eight people are known to have been injured. Everyone is receiving assistance. In Kharkiv, a direct drone strike destroyed four floors of an ordinary residential high-rise. Dozens of people were wounded, and two people were killed. My condolences… In Pavlohrad, there was an absolutely wicked strike near a shopping mall and on energy infrastructure. Nine people were injured in the city, including four children. There were also strikes on the Zhytomyr, Mykolaiv, Kyiv, Kherson, Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions. Russia continues to bet on ballistic terror, which is not limited to just one city or community. This week alone, 61 missiles of various types were used against Ukraine, including 56 that strike along a ballistic trajectory. There were also more than 1,560 attack drones and 1,540 aerial bombs. Every such attack on human life serves as a constant reminder – we need more pressure, more sanctions against Russia, and more air defense for Ukraine. I am grateful to those who are helping.

russians are hunting civilians with drones because the entire nation glorifies death and violence, like ISIS. It’s now happening in almost every frontline city and will continue to spread until russia is stopped.

@QerlM @Isa_Yusibov Wanneer heeft Turkije een beroep gedaan op artikel 5?